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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs, 
FRANK JOSEPH IRISH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880536-CA 
Priority Two 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the court's instructions to Appellant to seat 
himself and to not leave the courtroom without authorization 
constitute reversible error? 
2. Even if the court's comments were inappropriate, 
were they harmless error under the undisputed facts of this 
case? 
3. Was sufficient evidence presented during the trial 
to support the jury's finding that Appellant was guilty of 
driving under the influence of alcohol? 
4. Does the failure of Appellant-Irish to object during 
the trial to the court's comments to Appellant in the jury's 
presence, or to move for dismissal or for a directed verdict 
or for a new trial regarding that issue or regarding the 
alleged insufficiency of evidence, constitute a waiver of his 
right to appeal as to those issues? 
II 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Driving under the 
Influence of Alcohol, a violation of Section 12.24.100, Salt 
Lake City Code, a Class B misdemeanor, and from a conviction 
of Making an Improper Lane Change, a violation of Section 
12.44.060, Salt Lake City Code, an infraction, following a 
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, the Honorable Roger A. Livingston presiding. 
Ill 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant-Irish was convicted by a jury in the Third 
Circuit Court of violating City ordinances (1) prohibiting 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, (2) prohibiting moving from one clearly marked lane 
of traffic to another without giving the right-of-way to 
vehicles in the lane to be entered, nor untiL the driver has 
first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety 
and such driver has given the prescribed signal, and (3) 
prohibiting driving a vehicle without a valid Utah operator's 
license while such license was suspended. Appellant now seeks 
relief from the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that 
reversible error was made by the court in instructing 
Appellant, during the course of the trial, to be seated and 
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not to leave the courtroom without authorization and further 
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and 
improper lane change. 
IV 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS 
Appellant-Irish was convicted by a jury in the Third 
Circuit Court. No motion for new trial nor for certificate of 
probable cause was filed. 
V 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts, when viewed in a light favorable to upholding 
the jury verdict, demonstrate the following: 
1. On July 13, 1988 at approximately 10:35 p.m. the 
arresting officer and a companion officer observed Appellant-
Irish operating a motor vehicle which was stopped in the 
center east bound lane at the intersection of 800 West and 
North Temple Streets in Salt Lake City Utah. As the officers 
approached on their motorcycles from the rear the Appellant's 
vehicle remained stopped at the intersection, with its engine 
running, although the semaphore light had turned green. 
(Tr-50). 
2. Approximately half to three quarters of the way 
through the green-light cycle the Appellant?s vehicle 
proceeded forward at a very slow rate of speed. At no time 
while it was under the observation of the officers did the 
Appellant's vehicle exceed eight to ten miles per hour, 
although the speed limit in that area was 35 miles per hour. 
As the vehicle proceeded eastward it drifted to the right, 
without giving any turning signal, until it was nearly 
completely in the right lane rather than in the center lane 
where it had been. The vehicle then veered back into the 
center lane. (Tr-50,51,71,72 ). 
3. Upon observing the illegal lane change the officers 
initiated the red and blue flashing lights on their motor-
cycles, while traveling behind the Appellant vehicle. The 
Appellant continued to travel approximately another 150 to 200 
feet and showed no reaction to the flashing lights. At that 
time the officers initiated their sirens, and again there was 
no reaction from the Appellant. The officers initiated their 
sirens once again whereupon the Appellant vehicle started a 
very, very slow movement into the right lane and continued in 
the right lane for approximately another 200 feet at a very 
slow rate of speed before pulling off the road into a parking 
lot. (Tr-53,54). 
4. The arresting officer approached the vehicle and 
asked Appellant-Irish for his driver's license. The subject 
indicated he did not have one and that it had been suspended 
or taken away. At that time the officer detected the odor of 
an alcoholic beverage coming from the Appellant's vehicle and 
about his person. (Tr-54,55). 
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5. Upon request, Appellant-Irish got out of the car. 
He opened the door, swung his feet out, and used both hands 
not only in the door-jam but on the door itself to lift 
himself out of the vehicle. As he walked toward the back of 
the vehicle his movement was slow. He ran his hand all the 
way along the side of the car for balance as he walked. The 
odor of alcohol was prevalent, coming solely from Appellant-
Irish's person rather than also from within the car as before. 
(Tr-56,57). The officer observed that Appellant-Irish had a 
hard time speaking. His speech was slurred and repetitive. 
He continued asking the same questions of the officer time-
after-time although the officer answered the same questions 
several times. In addition, Appellant's eyes were bloodshot 
and glassy. (Tr-57). 
6. Thereafter, the officer had Appellant-Irish perform 
three field sobriety tests (Tr-61-67): a hand slapping test, 
a finger counting test, and a straight line test. Mr. Irish 
failed each test; he: (a) was unable to follow the instruc-
tions on the hand slapping test, and he kept hitting one hand 
two or three times on one side and joking about the test, even 
after being shown a second time how to perform it (Tr-63-65); 
(b) he tried the finger counting test, but did not actually 
count the fingers but simply recited various numbers at random 
while sliding his thumb around his fingers (Tr-64,66); and (c) 
on attempting the straight line test, he took four steps with 
his feet at angles rather than in a straight line and not 
touching his heel to his toe, and then he fell over against 
his car and stated that he was finished with the test and did 
not complete it as instructed (Tr-66,67). After the tests 
were performed, the arresting officer placed Appellant-Irish 
under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
(Tr-68). 
7. Prior to transporting him to the police station, the 
arresting officer advised Appellant-Irish that he wanted him 
to take an intoxilyzer test to determine his blood alcohol 
content. Appellant was quite belligerent and stated that he 
was not going to take any test of any sort. (Tr-68). 
8. After being transported to the police station, 
Appellant-Irish was shown the intoxilyzer instruments and he 
was given a demonstration of its characteristics and how the 
test would be administered. Appellant again refused to take 
the test and made a rude comment to the officers about where 
they could put the machine. (Tr-69). 
9. The officer then read to Appellant a written 
admonition which advised him that if he refused to take the 
intoxilyzer test his privilege to drive a motor vehicle may be 
revoked for one year. Even after hearing that admonition, 
Appellant refused to take the test, and therefore it was not 
administered. (Tr-69,70). 
10. During the entire period that the field sobriety 
tests were administered as well as during the discussions 
regarding the intoxilyzer at the police station, Appellant-
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Irish was belligerent, using vulgarity and profanity. He 
stated that he had large friends who were going to come and 
take care of the police officers after the incident was over, 
and vulgarly described what they could do with the intoxilyzer 
instrument. The officers did not retort or otherwise respond 
to Appellant-Irish1s belligerence. (Tr-64,68,69,78,79,86 ) . 
11. A jury trial was held on September 1, 1988. During 
the voir dire, the prosecutor brought to the court's attention 
that the Appellant-Irish had left the courtroom. The defense 
attorney advised the court that Appellant had left and that 
the attorney had not excused him. The judge commented that he 
had not excused Appellant either and decided to proceed in 
Appellant-Irish's absence. (Tr-32). 
12. At the commencement of the afternoon session of the 
trial following the noon recess, the prosecutor requested that 
the record reflect that neither Appellant-Irish nor his 
counsel were present in the courtroom. The judge acknowledged 
that fact and proceeded with the trial. Shortly thereafter 
defense counsel appeared in the courtroom without Appellant-
Irish. The court allowed defense counsel time to telephone 
his office or otherwise to try to locate his client. After 
some time had elapsed and Appellant-Irish had not been located 
the court decided to proceed in Appellant's absence once 
again. (Tr-46-48). 
13. Upon Appellant's finally arriving in the courtroom 
the judge instructed him as follows: 
"Mr. Irish, I want you to come up here and sit at 
this table and I am instructing you by order of this 
court that you are not to leave this courtroom 
unless and until you are so authorized by this 
court. Why don't you sit over there next to your 
counsel. Do you understand what Ifm saying to you?" 
(Tr-46-48). 
14. At the conclusion of the defendant's case and prior 
to the administering of jury instructions, the court stated 
that they would take a brief five minute recess. Prior to the 
recess the judge addressed defense counsel: 
"And Mr. Loyd will you stay with your client?" 
Mr. Loyd then stated that he would do so. (Tr-107). 
15. During cross examination Appellant-Irish admitted 
that he had had two cans of beer prior to his arrest: one at 
his home and one at his friend's home. (Tr-105,106) . 
VI 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. No Prejudice. 
The court's simple instructions to Appellant that he not 
leave the courtroom without authorization were in accordance 
with the court's discretion to control courtroom decorum they 
were justified by Appellant's own actions, and they did not 
suggest partiality. Any possible prejudice was cured by the 
court's instructions. 
2. Harmless Error. 
Even if the court's comments were error, they were 
harmless error in view of the overwhelming additional evidence 
presented at trial indicating Appellant's guilt. 
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3. Sufficient Evidence. 
The jury's findings that Appellant was guilty of driving 
under the influence of alcohol and of improper lane change 
were supported by sufficient evidence presented at trial. 
4. Appeal Waiver. 
Appellant-Irish has waived both of the issues raised on 
appeal due to his failure to properly preserve those issues at 
the trial court level. 
VII 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTING APPELLANT IN THE JURY'S 
PRESENCE REGARDING COURTROOM DECORUM 
A. THE COURT HAS JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO 
CONTROL COURTROOM DECORUM 
The trial court's instruction to Appellant-Irish, during 
the jury trial in this case, that he seat himself at his 
counsel's table and that he not leave the courtroom unless 
authorized to do so by the court was the result of Appellant's 
own actions during the trial and was an appropriate exercise 
of the court's discretion in controlling courtroom decorum. 
During the jury voir dire the defendant left the courtroom 
without the court's authorization or his own counsel's 
authorization. That fact was brought to the court's 
attention, which determined to proceed with the voir dire in 
Appellant's absence. (Tr-32). 
At the commencement of the afternoon session following 
the noon recess, the court noted that neither Appellant-Irish 
nor his counsel were present in the courtroom. The court 
proceeded in their absence. Shortly thereafter Appellant's 
counsel arrived without his client. The court gave 
Appellant's counsel some time to make a telephone call to his 
office or otherwise to attempt to locate Appellant, but 
counsel was unsuccessful. The court then proceeded once again 
with the trial in Appellant's absence. When Appellant 
eventually arrived in the courtroom, the judge instructed him 
to be seated and to not leave without the court's 
authorization. Those comments by the court constituted a 
clear and justified attempt to avoid further disruptions of 
the trial as had already occurred twice during the trial. 
Nothing in the trial record suggests that the court's comments 
to Appellant were other than courteous and judicious. Nothing 
in those comments suggested a lack of impartiality on the part 
of the judge nor did they pertain to the merits of the case. 
(Tr-46-48). 
In the administration of justice, the judge is charged 
with the preservation of order in the court and with the duty 
to see that justice is not obstructed by any person or persons 
whatsoever. A measure of discretion resides in the court in 
this respect, and its exercise will not be reviewed or 
disturbed on appeal unless it appears that prejudice resulted 
from the denial of a legal right. 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, §40. 
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The manner of maintaining order in the courtroom is 
within the trial judge's sound discretion and will depend upon 
the type of disruption before him. Burgess v. Towne, 538 P.2d 
559, 563 (Wash.App. 1975). See also Standard 6-3.3 of the 
American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Function of 
the Trial Judge, Second Edition, and Canon 3, subparagraph 
(A)(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct (adopted March 1, 
1974; revised effective May 18, 1987) regarding a trial 
judge's obligation to maintain order and decorum in 
proceedings before the court.. In Illinois v. Allen the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
"It is essential to the proper administration of 
criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be 
the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our 
country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of 
elementary standards of proper conduct should not 
and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges 
confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly 
defiant defendants must be given sufficient 
discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. 
No one formula for maintaining the appropriate 
courtroom atmosphere will be best in all 
situations." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343; 
90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061; 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 359 (1970) 
B. THE COURTfS COMMENTS WERE 
NOT PREJUDICIAL 
In determining whether a trial judge's remarks to an 
accused in a criminal case may prejudice the minds of the 
jurors against the accused sufficiently to constitute 
reversible error, the courts have frequently considered a 
number of factors in relation to the remarks. Those factors 
include the circumstances under which, and the matter in 
which, such remarks were made, as well as the peculiar impact 
of such remarks on the case itself, the existence or lack, of 
justification or excuse for such remarks, and the curative 
effects of any subsequent action or statements by the judge 
seeking to palliate or remove the prejudice engendered by such 
remarks. 34 ALR.3d 1313, 1318, §2. See also 75 Am.Jur.2d 
Trial, §106. 
The instances in which such judicial comments have been 
held to be reversible error have generally been those in which 
there was no justification for the judge's comments, or which 
manifested a hostile attitude toward the defendant, or which 
expressed an opinion that the defendant was guilty or 
otherwise suggested a lack of impartiality by the judge. 34 
ALR.3d 1313, §25(a); 75 Am.Jur.2d, §106. On the other hand, 
many courts have ruled that in the absence of such prejudicial 
elements, comments made by the trial court in an attempt to 
control courtroom decorum do not constitute reversible error. 
34 ALR.3d 1313, §25(b). 
In a situation quite similar to the Appellantfs herein, a 
reversal of a defendant's conviction was held not to be 
mandated by the trial court's actions or comments relating to 
the tardiness of the defendant in appearing before the court 
and the delay occasioned thereby, in the presence of 
prospective jurors and those chosen for the panel which 
ultimately decided the defendant's guilt. People v. McCord, 
361 N.E.2d 13 (111. 1977). In McCord it was held that the 
comments by the trial judge, reasonably construed, did not 
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indicate any opinion as to the facts of the case or of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence, and that the conduct of the 
trial court did not bespeak prejudice to the defendant. See 
also State v. Greene, 206 S.E.2d (NC 1974); State v. Brewer, 
301 So.2d 630 (LA 1974). 
The judge's comments in the instant case were similar to 
those made in McCord. They were justified by Appellant's own 
actions, they did not indicate any opinion as to the facts of 
the case or Appellant's guilt or innocence, and they did not 
bespeak prejudice to the accused. 
C. ANY POSSIBLE PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT 
WAS CURED BY THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
In the event the trial judge's comments to Appellant-
Irish set forth hereinabove could be interpreted as in some 
way prejudicing the jury toward Appellant, such prejudice was 
cured by jury instructions given by the court at the conclu-
sion of the trial. Instruction No. 1 advised the jury that in 
determining the facts, it may consider only the evidence given 
at the trial. (Record, 21; attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
Instruction No. 14 stated as follows: 
"If during this trial the court has said or done 
anything which has suggested to you that it is 
inclined to favor the claims or position of either 
party, you will not permit yourselves to be 
influenced by any such suggestion. 
"The court has not intended to indicate any opinion 
as to which witness are or are not worthy of 
belief, nor which party should prevail. If any 
expression has seemed to indicate an opinion 
relating to any of these matters, you should 
disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges 
of the facts." (Record, 35; attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B"). 
_i Q _ 
Although defense counsel did not make objection to the 
court's comments at the time they were made or otherwise 
suggest any curative admonition at that time, the afore-
mentioned instructions were given by the court expressly for 
the purpose of curing any potential prejudice which may have 
resulted from such statement or action as objected to by 
Appellant on this appeal. Such instructions have generally 
been found to be effective in dispelling possible prejudice 
where the prejudice is not so substantial or manifest that it 
cannot reasonably be cured by such jury instructions. See 
United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595 (1987, CA6 KY); United 
States v. Marshall, 767 F.2d 293 (1985, CA6 Tenn); 34 ALR.3d 
1313, §5. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT'S INSTRUCTING APPELLANT 
WAS INAPPROPRIATE, IT CONSTITUTED HARMLESS 
ERROR UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
The other evidence in this case of Appellant-Irish's 
guilt is so overwhelming, that even if the comments of the 
trial judge were prejudicial, they were harmless error. The 
facts which support the jury's verdict in this case include 
the following: 
1. As Appellant-Irish operated his vehicle he failed to 
move forward after a semaphore light had turned green through 
approximately half to three quarters of the way through the 
green-light cycle. (Tr-50). 
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2. When he finally did proceed forward he did so at an 
unusually slow rate of speed, not exceeding 8-10 miles per 
hour during the entire time he was under the officers' 
observation despite a speed limit in that area of 35 miles per 
hour. (Tr-51,71). 
3. His vehicle drifted into the next lane of traffic 
without his giving a turning signal and then abruptly veered 
back into the original lane. (Tr-51,71). 
4. Despite the officers1 initiating the red and blue 
flashing lights on their motorcycles Appellant continued to 
travel approximately another 150 to 200 feet showing no 
reaction to the flashing lights. When the officers initiated 
their sirens the first time there was no reaction from 
Appellant. Only after the officers initiated their sirens a 
second time did the Appellant react by moving very very slowly 
to the right of the roadway and traveling approximately 
another 200 feet before pulling off the road into a parking 
lot. (Tr-53,54). 
5. Appellant-Irish exuded an odor of alcoholic beverage 
from his person, and he had a hard time speaking. His speech 
was slurred and repetitive, and his eyes were bloodshot and 
glassy. (Tr-54-57). 
6. When he got out of his car, Appellant had to use 
both hands to lift himself from the vehicle, and as he walked 
toward the back of the vehicle he had to run his hand along 
the side of the car for balance. (Tr-56,57). 
_1 c;_ 
7. He attempted to perform three field sobriety tests: 
a hand slapping test, a finger counting test, and a straight 
line test. (Tr-61-67). Mr. Irish failed each test; he: (a) 
was unable to follow the instructions on the hand slapping 
test, and he kept hitting one hand two or three times on one 
side and joking about the test, even after being shown a 
second time how to perform it (Tr-63-65); (b) he tried the 
finger counting test, but did not actually count the fingers 
but simply recited various numbers at random while sliding his 
thumb around his fingers (Tr-64,66); and (c) on attempting the 
straight line test, he took four steps with his feet at angles 
rather than in a straight line and not touching his heel to 
his toe, and then he fell over against his car and stated that 
he was finished with the test and did not complete it as 
instructed (Tr-66,67). 
8. He was belligerent with the officers using a great 
deal of foul and abusive language toward them. (Tr-78,79). 
9. Based upon all the aforementioned facts and speaking 
as a qualified expert with respect to persons under the 
influence of alcohol, the arresting officer expressed his 
opinion that at the time he stopped Appellant-IrishTs vehicle 
Appellant was under the influence of alcohol. (Tr-68). 
10. Despite the officers? giving Appellant three different 
opportunities to take the intoxilyzer test, demonstrating the 
test and explaining its functions to him, and reading him a 
written admonition as to the possible adverse effects of his 
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refusing to take the test, Appellant steadfastly refused to do 
so and vulgarly suggested what the officers could do with the 
intoxilyzer instrument. (Tr-68-70 ). 
11. Appellant admitted to drinking two cans of beer prior 
to his arrest. (Tr-105,106 ). 
The law is clear that this error committed during trial 
will be viewed as harmless error where there is no reasonable 
likelihood in the absence of such error that there would have 
been a different result. State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 
(Utah 1986). See also State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1986); State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1980). 
There is such overwhelming additional evidence in the 
instant case to sustain the jury's verdict, that it can be 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that if the statement by 
the trial judge complained of by Appellant was error, such 
error was harmless. Further, the error, if any, was not only 
harmless but was invited by Appellantfs actions. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY'S VERDICT FINDING APPELLANT 
GUILTY OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL AND OF IMPROPER LANE CHANGE 
Appellant-Irish argues on appeal that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to support the jury verdict that Appellant was 
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and of 
improper lane change. Appellant correctly states the standard 
of review regarding sufficiency of evidence, which is that the 
court will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he was convicted. (State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). However, Appellant erroneously 
argues that because the defendant at trial provided an 
explanation as to each item of evidence introduced to support 
the charge that he was driving while under the influence of 
alcohol, "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt as to the efficacy of that particular element." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10). The problem with Appellant's 
argument is that it does not necessarily follow that because 
there may be reasonable explanations for each allegation, the 
jury could not disbelieve those explanations and rather find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that each item of evidence indicated 
the guilt of the accused. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a jury is not 
obligated to accept a defendant's protestations of innocence 
and that the court will not substitute its judgment for the 
jury's verdict when it is supported by substantial evidence. 
State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987). The court 
has also said that it may reverse a jury verdict only if, 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, 
there is no substantial evidence to support it. Matter of 
Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985). There was 
certainly substantial competent evidence introduced at the 
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trial in the instant case to support the jury's verdict, as 
set forth in detail in Point II of this argument hereinabove. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT-IRISH HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO 
RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL REGARDING COURT'S 
INSTRUCTING APPELLANT IN JURY'S PRESENCE 
OR REGARDING SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
An examination of the record on appeal, including the 
trial transcript, indicates that at no time during the trial 
nor thereafter until the filing of the appeal in this matter 
did Appellant-Irish make any objection or motion with respect 
to either of the issues Appellant now raises on appeal. 
This court, and the Utah Supreme Court, have ruled, on 
many occasions, that they will not rule on a contention 
presented for the first time on appeal. State v. Chancellor, 
704 P.2d 579 (Utah 1985); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 
1981), cert den. 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595 
(1981); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987); State v. Aase, 762 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). See 
also State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1983), cert den. 464 
U.S. 894, 78 L.Ed.2d 231, 104 S.Ct. 241 (1983). 
This court should decline to consider either of the 
claims of error by Appellant regarding improper reprimand by 
the court or regarding insufficiency of evidence as to either 
of the violations for which Appellant was convicted. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's simple instructions to Appellant that he seat 
himself and not leave the courtroom without authorization was 
an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion to control 
courtroom decorum. It was justified by Appellantfs own 
actions, it did not manifest any hostile attitude toward the 
defendant, it did not indicate any opinion by the court that 
the defendant was guilty, nor did it otherwise suggest a lack 
of impartiality on the part of the judge. If any prejudice 
was created in the minds of the jury by the comment, it was 
cured by the court's jury instructions. Even if the court's 
comments were prejudicial, such were harmless error in view of 
the overwhelming additional evidence of Appellant-Irish's 
guilt. There was certainly sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict finding the Appellant guilty of driving under 
the influence of alcohol and of improper lane change. 
Further, Appellant waived his right to appeal on either the 
improper comment issue or the sufficiency of evidence issue. 
The conviction should be affirmed and remanded for 
execution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / " day of July, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Vernice S. Ah Ching, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, at the Salt Lake City Legal 
Defender Association, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, by depositing the same in the U. S. mail, postage 
prepaid thereon, this // day of July, 1989. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
These instructions contain the law that governs you in this 
case. In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence 
given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or ordered 
stricken by me may not be considered by you. 
No one of these instructions states all of the law of this 
case, but all of them must be taken and considered together inasmuch 
as they are connected with and related to each other. 
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of 
law. Regardless of your own opinion, it would be a violation of 
your sworn duty to base your verdict upon any other view of the law 
than that given in my instructions. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
If during this trial the court has said or done anything 
which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the 
claims or position of either party, you will not permit 
yourselves to be influence by any such suggestion. 
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to 
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, nor which party 
should prevail. If any expression has seemed to indicate an 
opinion relating to any of these matters, you should disregard 
it, because you are the exclusive judges of the facts. 
